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Abstract 
Specialisation within professions poses some interesting questions that go to the heart 
of the professional project. Does specialisation undermine the value, rationale even, of 
the general professional qualification? Or is it a vehicle for intra-professional closure, 
a means of strengthening the competitive hand of the 'elite'? From the consumer 
perspective, is specialisation an unalloyed good?  Is the way in which the legal 
professions manage specialisation consistent with them protecting the public or the 
professions’ interests?  Utilising empirical data for a series of projects on legal aid 
programmes in the UK, this paper will examine the tensions between quality and 
access inherent in the notion of specialisation and consider some of the implications 
for professional theory and regulation.  It will be argued that specialisation, which is a 
necessary trade-off between consumer interest and detriment, has been resolved by 
the profession in its own rather than the public’s interest.   
                                                 
1 I am extremely grateful for comments on an earlier draft from Soren Holm, Bob Lee and Annette 
Morris.  All errors are my own. 
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Lawyer Specialisation - Managing the Professional Paradox 
I. Introduction 
Specialisation within professions poses some interesting questions.  Do the claims that 
you need to specialise to be competent undermine the value of, even rationale for, the 
general professional qualification? Is specialisation a vehicle for intra-professional 
closure, a means of strengthening the competitive hand of an elite within an elite? 
From the consumer perspective, does specialisation offer real improvements in 
quality?  Are such improvements an unalloyed good? This paper explores the 
dependent, yet paradoxically antagonistic, concepts of specialisation and 
professionalism that these questions raise.   
Specialisation is necessary to professionalism: professions are, after all, usually 
founded on a claim to exclusive application of specialist knowledge.  Superficially, all 
professionals are specialists: lawyers ‘specialise’ in law, whilst in England and Wales 
the proliferation of accreditation schemes within the solicitors’ profession attests to 
the increased importance of the distinction between specialists and generalists (SRA 
2007).  Whilst specialists may (claim to) be the ones leading a field, developing the 
law and its techniques, and thus advancing the broad claims of the profession to 
advance the production of specialist knowledge in their client’s interests, 
specialisation also threatens the professional project as intra-professional competition 
and specialisation intensifies.  It does this in two ways.  One threat, not the principal 
focus of this article, is a concern about social, political and cultural homogeneity: the 
risk that specialisation has, or will, render the professions sociologically fragmented, 
stratified and lacking in any professional coherence.  Whilst principally of political 
significance, the fragmentation and stratification theses also link to concerns about 
professional ethics and regulation more broadly.  As we shall see, fragmentation also 
appears to impact on the profession’s approach to the second threat. 
This second threat is more fundamental: it pertains directly to the profession’s core 
claim to competence.  The legal profession typically provides practitioners with a 
general warrant of competence; on the whole, once qualified a lawyer can practice in 
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any area of law.2  The existence of specialists raises questions about the validity of 
this generalist qualification: calling into question whether lawyers are genuinely 
omni-competent.3  Being a specialist necessarily involves a claim to higher quality 
than being non-specialist. If that claim is well founded, differences in quality expose 
generalists, and the profession as a whole, to a challenge to their competence.  If the 
professional competence of specialists is significantly higher than that of generalists, 
and/or if generalists show significant levels of incompetence, then the value of this 
general warrant of competence is called into question, along with the value of the 
profession itself.    
This paper is able to looks empirically at this issue.  It considers the levels of 
competence demonstrated by specialists and non-specialists in legal aid work in 
England and Wales.  It shows whether such specialists genuinely provide higher 
quality than non-specialists (referred to below as relative quality) and also whether 
generalists might nevertheless be ‘good enough’ (i.e. whether levels of incompetence 
are at tolerable levels: referred to below as absolute quality).4  However, quality is 
not the only basis on which specialisation should be judged as specialisation comes at 
a cost.  In particular, specialisation has the potential to reduce access and increase 
cost.  Whilst a limited number of studies have addressed the importance of 
specialisation in the legal profession (Kritzer 1998, Genn and Genn 1989, Moorhead 
et al, 2003), the empirical work here aims to represent an advance in two senses: 
1. it more directly quantifies the differences between specialists and generalists 
in terms of quality, providing quantitative indicators of relative and absolute 
quality; and, 
                                                 
2 There are some exceptions to this, for instance, immigration law. 
3 This phrase derives from Heinz and Laumman’s work specialisation in the 1970s.   
4 It is possible to further refine the position.  Generalists might be competent enough for certain tasks 
whilst others may demand specialist knowledge and skills.  To keep the paper within manageable 
bounds this distinction is not pursued in the analysis. 
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2. it begins to quantify the consumer detriment associated with specialisation 
enabling an explicit articulation of the tensions between benefit and detriment 
inherent in professional closure generally and specialisation in particular.   
The latter point is important as, to date, professional regulators have indicated a 
wariness of formalising a recognition of specialisation.  Keen not to grant specialists 
within their ranks competitive advantages over their generalist colleagues, they argue 
that formalising specialisation reduces the number of suppliers of legal services, 
makes them harder to access and, in a free market, more expensive.5 By bringing both 
quality and detriment together we can see clearly how the structurally functional 
benefits of specialisation are necessarily linked with the consumer detriments 
associated with market control.  It follows that specialisation is a microcosm of the 
dilemma posed more generally by professional services: are the benefits of 
professional services real and how far are they outweighed by anti-competitive 
detriments?  More specifically, professional regulation of specialisation raises 
questions of how best to balance quality and detriment and how to best coordinate 
specialist and generalist practitioners to maximise the interests of consumers.   
Where they permit accreditation schemes at all, the profession’s current approach to 
specialisation, to generalise somewhat, is to make accreditation voluntary (so that 
non-accredited practitioners are not prevented from doing the work) and those 
accreditation schemes are based on minimal standards of competence (so that all 
practitioners who wish to gain accreditation stand a reasonable chance of doing so).  
This is in direct contrast to the legal aid scheme where specialist accreditation is 
mandatory to be able to carry out significant volumes of legal aid work in the 
particular specialism.  Arguably at least legal aid specialisation is also set at a higher 
standard.    
Having clear data on both the benefits and detriments of compulsion enables us to go 
some way in evaluating the best approach to regulating specialisation.  It will be 
argued that the profession’s approach is incoherent in public interest terms and can be 
                                                 
5 This study does not focus on price increases as it deals with legal aid where there is a monopsonic 
purchaser (the Legal Services Commission) who controls price; hence detriment is shown by the 
impact of specialisation on accessibility of provision. 
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best explained as part of the profession’s desire to protect its member’s interests and 
its collective identity.  As such it is an example of how the professional paradox, 
which is a necessary trade-off between consumer interest and detriment, has been 
resolved by the profession in its own rather than the public’s interest.  
Before doing so, the paper sets contextualises the discussion by reviewing some of the 
literature on specialisation (Section II).  Much of this literature focuses on 
specialisation amongst the big firms; this paper concentrates on a different sector of 
the profession.  Section III makes up the bulk of the paper, discussing data from three 
studies examining the impact of specialistion on quality and accessibility of legal aid 
services in England and Wales.  Section IV discusses the implications of these 
findings. 
II. Specialisation and the professions: some context and theory 
In the context of professions, the literature on theories of specialisation tend to raise 
three particularly interesting questions.  The first is the supply-demand question.   Is 
specialisation a symptom of external, client-driven demand or does specialisation 
operate to drive, define, or even manufacture, that demand?  In other words: are 
specialist services supply or demand led?  The second is the quality question.  To 
what extent is specialisation associated with improvement in quality? Even if 
specialist services are ‘better’ is it possible that they are also narrower and less 
comprehensive?  Specialists may diagnose problems so that that they fit their 
specialist expertise rather than fit with the client’s broader needs for a solution.  
Relatedly quality may come at a price if specialisation gives rise to other consumer 
detriment (such as high cost or access problems associated with significant limits on 
the number of specialists available nationwide).  Similarly, some argue that 
specialisation may narrow the ethical base of specialists.  Thirdly, the legitimacy 
question: does specialisation threaten the legitimacy of the profession’s general claim 
to competence?  Does it lead to intolerable fragmentation within the profession and 
also reinforce traditional notions of social control in elites where, arguably, they 
matter most? 
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The supply-demand question 
Specialisation within the legal profession is a phenomenon which is both well 
established (Kahn and Kahn, op.cit., point out it dates back to at least the 1950s) and 
growing in impact (Heinz et al 2005: 37).  Economists point to specialisation as a 
crucial engine of economic growth: “[B]ecause [specialists] can utilize a particular set 
of knowledge more intensively when demand is higher” (Garicano and Hubbard 
2003: 499; see also Garicano and Hubbard 2004).     Efficiency drives growth and law 
firms’ needs for larger markets promotes greater specialisation.   
Sociologists have tended to concentrate on the distributional implications of such an 
expansion, with elite players using specialisation to reinforce their established 
success.  As markets for legal services expand, those well placed in the markets can 
solidify their position by expanding and specialising to underline their reputation 
through that process of specialisation (Heinz et al 2001: 345 in Seron 2007: 583).  The 
causal link between growth and specialisation, and what lies beneath it, is important.  
If specialisation leads to growth, is this driven by client needs for better, more 
efficient services, or is specialisation a process through which the profession 
manufactures the new, more detailed and more expensive services which drive its 
expansion?  In other words, is specialisation a process of mystification which delivers 
significant benefits to the profession at the expense of consumers or is specialisation a 
response to larger commercial forces which need and benefit from ever more 
expensive and extensive legal services? 
The growth in the size of the professions and the market for legal services, 
particularly in the commercial sector, has been phenomenal both domestically and 
internationally.  In terms of firm size, one debate has been whether this growth has 
been driven by the internal demands of firms to retain and promote staff or by the 
external needs of the market (Galanter 1990, Sander 1992).  Hadfield points to the 
underlying rationales and structures of common law and the economics of legal work 
as inappropriately driving increased complexity and cost (Hadfield 2000) whereas 
others would focus on the capacity to add real value to commercial transactions 
(Gilson 1984, Gilson 1993).  At the heart of these debates is the perennial concern 
over whether the profession is controlled by, or controls, the market; and whether 
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specialisation is developed to aid the internal logic of professional growth or the real 
needs of clients.   
Whilst much of this case for specialisation is economic, the creation of competitive 
advantage and the desire to promote productivity is also implicated as a device for 
social control within firms (Heinz et al 2005: 292).  Specialties shift and multiply as 
increasingly bureaucratic and business driven organisations seek to control work in a 
way which was the sole domain previously of charismatic, client partners (ibid. 303).  
This horizontal specialisation (splitting law-firms and legal careers into sub-
disciplines) is accompanied by vertical (or ‘hierarchical’) specialisation : where senior 
‘experts’ are shielded from easy problems by the junior colleagues they train and 
manage, “allowing them to specialize in problems they have a comparative advantage 
in addressing” as well as using their position, in larger firms,  to monitor those below 
them and coordinate the hierarchies with incentives allowing those at the top of the 
hierarchy to exploit or maximise the human capital of those below them (Garicano 
and Hubbard 2004: 2 and 7).6 
Specialisation and quality 
The economic justifications for horizontal specialisation only implicitly focus on 
consumer interests: narrower training and practice mean it should cheaper and easier 
to provide better services.  The opportunities provided by growth increase profitability 
and/or competitiveness but they do not necessarily lead to improvements in quality.  
Reductions in cost are not necessarily passed on to clients.  There are legitimate 
doubts about the extent to which lawyers genuinely compete for clients on price and 
the real potential, given the difficulties consumers have in evaluating quality, that 
high price will be seen as prestigious indication of quality – particularly at the higher 
ends of the professional market (Hadfield 2000).  In the absence of price-competition, 
                                                 
6 Where vertical specialisation involves non-lawyers it brings with it a particular threat to the 
legitimacy of professions R Moorhead, A. Sherr and A. Paterson, 'Contesting Professionalism: Legal 
Aid and Nonlawyers in England and Wales, (2003)'37 Law & Society Review 765-808 ; Feinburg 
1994: 371; Kritzer 1999: 720), but these concerns are beyond the scope of this paper which focuses on 
horizontal specialisation. 
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professions may exploit comparative advantage and benefits of economies of scale 
and scope for themselves rather than those they serve.   
Similarly, it is easy to see how, given the information asymmetries between 
professions and their clients, specialisation might be perceived as professional 
mystification where the specialists develop complex solutions to (legal) problems 
which only they can validate as right or wrong whether or not simpler solutions would 
be adequate or even more efficient.  On this view, specialisation is a repeat of the 
fundamental self-referential ‘trick’ of professionalisation: knowledge developed for, 
and validated by, the profession’s own interests not those of the consumer (Abel 
1997) or as a manifestation of law’s dysfunctional tendency towards complexity 
(Hadfield 2000).  Conversely, Freidson, for example, defends the impact of 
specialisation on quality: 
“Thus, in the broadest sense, the ideology of professionalism claims that its 
specialization is fitted to individual tasks rather than standardized production.  
It claims that the work of a trained and experienced specialist is superior to 
that of an amateur; in a narrower sense, it claims that the work of a specialist 
with professionally controlled training is both superior to and more reliable 
than that of someone who may have experience but lacks training.” (Friedson 
2001: 111). 
On this reading, specialisation enhances the professions “capacity to be flexible and 
adaptive in dealing with qualitative differences among individual tasks” (ibid 111-
112).  Educational psychology has classically claimed that specialists see problems 
differently from the less expert (Schõn 1983) and it is easy to appreciate how 
specialisation might thus lead to higher levels of quality.  Difficult problems become 
familiar and easy.  Specialists become more discerning in their problem-solving 
strategies.  Indeed, a limited number of studies have been able to point in general 
terms to specialists doing their job better than non specialists in the legal field (Kritzer 
1998, Genn and Genn 1989, Moorhead et al, 2003). 
Routinisation, subordination, de-ethicalisation 
The claim that specialisation is the preference of professionals, because it enables 
them to concentrate on work which is then both more rewarding and efficient, is 
directly challenged by the deprofessionalisation thesis.  Under this thesis, 
specialisation is seen as socially harmful to those who practice it because of an 
8 
association between specialisation, routinisation and the squeezing out of creativity 
and professional skill (Stefancic and Delgado 2005:10).  Lawyer’s, often operating 
under tight economic constraints, respond by routinising: automatically and 
unreflexively responding to the needs of clients as they are deskilled because law 
firms become increasingly like factories (Sommerlad 1991 and 2001, Sommerlad and 
Wall 1995). 
Specialisation also has the potential to be detrimental to the ‘ethical sense’ of the 
profession.  It is claimed that specialisation has advanced alongside a decline in 
lawyer autonomy (Heinz et al 2005: 12 citing Nelson 1988; Kronoman 1993).  In this 
context, the distributional impact, or unevenness, of specialisation is important: 
commercial lawyers are bigger, more specialised, wealthier and have higher status 
they are seen as dominating professional judgments on what is honoured by 
practitioners: 
“While there are competing ideological tropes of prestige, the overall findings 
suggest a consensus that “service for powerful clients who provide 
opportunities for both the exercise of arcane skills and a substantial income” 
trumps fiduciary responsibilities to service the public.” (Seron 2007: 589 
citing Heinz et al 2005: 97).   
Here, then, the concern is that technical opportunities granted by being able to truly 
render oneself ‘expert’ through specialisation, coupled with the significant economic 
gains accompanying commercial practice where vertical and hierarchical 
specialisation seems most acute, pose a direct challenge to the public interest values 
of professionalism.  As Heinz and Laumann provocatively demonstrate: the core 
values of lawyers are not justice oriented, but economic (1977).  Law, and 
specialistion within law, is predominantly a tool for business success.  The concern is 
that lawyers will, through specialisation and other business practices, ape their 
business clients so wholly as to diminish traditional, collegiate professional paradigms 
(Seron 2007: 591).  This is a familiar refrain in the legal ethics’ literature (e.g. Gordon 
2000, Kronman 1993) but, as Seron reminds us, has also been a current in 
sociological writings on law firms dating back at least to the 1950s (Seron 2007: 590 
discussing C. Wright Mills 1953).  The idea that business has taken over law has more 
historical longevity than is often implied; but the concern remains that specialisation 
transforms the client relationship from a situation where a lawyer-client relationship 
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“tended to be personal, general, continuous, and face-to-face…  …is transformed into 
a more technical, focused, impersonal, case-by-case business-like model.” (Seron 
2007: 595).   
Interestingly, it can also be argued that de-ethicalisation is achieved by a very 
different route to that of de-personalistion.  The larger, highly specialised commercial 
law firms tend to emphasise how much they put client interests and business skills at 
the heart of their approach.  This may be attempted as a partial antitode to the 
perception that specialists milk cases through the development of expensive, over-
specialist solutions.  Couple this with the desire for specialists to concentrate on 
particular client groups and they are encouraged to put their creative talents fully in 
the service of their clients, to become, in Cain’s memorable phrase, ‘conceptive 
ideologists’ (Cain 1979: 352) rather than seeing their role as operating in the public 
interest.  Under this explanation, specialisation drives de-ethicalisation because it is 
too personal, lawyers become too close to their clients and fail to think with sufficient 
levels of forensic detachment. 
Both arguments are driven by the apparent dominance of business clients over the 
profession and its activities but there is a more subtle argument about the way in 
which specialisation narrows the expertise of lawyers and fails to identify and address 
the full range of a client’s problems; that advice is not suitably holistic in that it fails 
to address a) latent legal problems outside the specialists expertise and b) fails to 
address problems in a wider ethical or social context so as to render solutions which 
are of the most stable and appropriate kind for clients and society (Moorhead et al, 
2006).  In this sense, specialisation may drive cognitive narrowness, lawyer’s seeing 
problems too narrowly because they only understand a narrow field of law, an issue to 
which we return below. 
Stratification and fragmentation 
Specialisation’s impact on the profession at the collective level is also criticised.  It is 
associated with the absence of common beliefs about what is right or wrong in a 
professional sense (Seron op.cit.: 593) as well as reframing debates about equality and 
diversity in the profession.    Here, the economic efficiency case for specialisation as 
market closure is paralleled by a process of social closure.  Dramatic growth in the 
size of the profession and broader (if partial) trends towards equality and diversity 
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meant women and ethnic minorities had to be absorbed into the profession.  
Specialisation was a vehicle for permitting this, but in a socially stratified way.  The 
professions may have become more open to women and ethnic minorities, but larger 
questions remain about the openness of the elites within the professions who retain, 
up to a point, historic demographic characteristics (Heinz et al 2005; Shiner and 
Newburn 1995; Heinz and Laumann 1982 in Seron 2007).  In this sense, social 
closure as part of the professional project is moved from the outer boundaries of the 
profession to its inner elites.  Specialisation structures marginalisation and protects 
elites. 
Whilst stratification has enabled the profession to maintain, in its elites, traditional 
forms of social closure, specialisation itself poses distinct threats to the ideological 
claim of a common professional bond suggested by a uniform qualification.  
Specialist communities within professions may deepen their ties with each other, 
whilst the profession as a whole has less common-interest and engagement (Heinz et 
al, 2005: 318-319), prompting fears that professions lack coherence or are “more 
diverse and less integrated” (Heinz et al 2005: 8).  Specialist hierarchies – with their 
implied technical and meritocratic claims - replace social hierarchies (Heinz et al, 
2005: 293), but reinforce the power of elites (elite firms within the profession and 
powerful partners within the firms).  At the political level, specialisation threatens 
fragmentation.   
“Lawyers have taken refuge in specialization, which has made it more difficult 
for lawyers as a group to identify common economic or ideological interests as 
a basis for a collective agenda. The growing fragmentation of the bar has been 
attributed to lawyers' own entrepreneurial ingenuity. As Nelson and Trubek 
observe, “the key to the economic and political success of American lawyers 
as a group has been their adaptiveness. But the cost has been the erosion of a 
distinctive professional tradition and the absence of centralized power within 
the profession capable of enforcing a particular vision of professional ideals”.” 
(Rostain: 2004: 150 also citing Abel, 1989; Heinz and Laumann, 1982; Heinz 
et al., 1998) 
The paradox of specialisation and professionalism 
Within the context of the debates sketched out above, it is possible to see how the 
concerns that have been expressed about professionalism are now repeated for, or 
have shifted to be considered within, debates about specialisation.  Of particular 
interest is the paradox that specialisation presents to professionals.  The paradox is 
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essentially this: a profession’s fundamental claim is to specialised expertise over a 
body of knowledge (law in this case) which give them exclusive rights to practice that 
knowledge. Similarly, under this claim, professions which promote specialisation, 
promote the evolution of knowledge in a way that is theoretically inclined to the better 
development of that knowledge.  Conversely, however, whilst specialisation may 
advance knowledge, it also threatens to disrupt the profession’s internal logic.  As 
specialisation leads to internal differentiation within professions, so it threatens the 
original rationale or guarantee provided by ‘ordinary’ professional status.  Implicitly 
or explicitly, specialists within professions challenge the competence of less 
specialised colleagues:  it is “increasingly difficult to be a successful non-specialist” 
when there are successful specialists to compete against (Law and Kim 2005: 729).   
These competing stories of specialisation suggest two familiar theoretical strains in 
the sociology of professions.  One is the structural functional vision: professions 
represent the best available means of managing the provision of complex services.  
The other is market control theory. The idea that profession’s employ their monopoly 
of expertise to reduce competition to the detriment of consumers.  Potentially, 
specialisation fits both stories.  It may improve quality and produce more and better 
knowledge with which to solve people’s problems.  Conversely, it may be a 
mechanism for increasing or solidifying market control by the professions, or elites 
within them, reducing access and increasing price.  Importantly, the theories are 
basically antithetical.  They cannot both be true at the same time.   Part of the reason 
for the resilience of these two theories is that, “the absence of reliable data on the 
quality of professional services makes it extremely difficult to cleanly distinguish 
between these two hypotheses….   Whereas the asymmetric information [or 
functionality] hypothesis argues that licensing should increase quality, the capture [or 
control] hypothesis argues that quality should remain unchanged, or may even 
deteriorate as competition is reduced.” (Law and Kim 2005: 725).   Another reason 
for this resilience is that, because evidence and argument on the professions can, 
relatively easily, be assembled to meet either story both can appear to be true at the 
same time.  As we shall see at the end of this paper, it is the ways in which 
specialisation are formalised and used by the profession’s that gives us an indication 
of whether professional calculations have appropriately balanced professional self-
interest with public interest. 
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The next section of the paper addresses these issues through empirical data on the 
impact of specialisation on quality and accessibility of legal services.  Quality is the 
principal benefit claimed to arise from specialisation: through looking at this we can 
get a sense of how structurally functional specialisation really is.  It does so through 
the examination of original empirical data on the quality and accessibility of legal aid 
services in England and Wales which have moved considerably towards high levels of 
compulsory specialisation.   
The extent to which specialisation advances market control is more difficult to deal 
with.  The obvious problem, that specialists would increase prices, is not a suitable 
variable in the legal aid arena where prices are largely controlled centrally by a 
monopsonic purchaser (the State).  Other examples of consumer detriment have to 
provide a focus.  In this sense, reduced accessibility is seen as indicating the tendency 
for specialisation to engender ‘control’, although consumer detriment is the more 
accurate phrase.  In showing both benefit and detriment, function and control, to be 
necessarily associated the concept of specialisation the paper seeks to illustrate how 
the oppositional interpretations of professional monopolies (‘detriment’ and 
‘functionality’) attributed to professional monopolies can both be present at the same 
time.  This paradox is the paradox that professionalism and specialisation creates and 
provides the tension that professional regulators have to manage 
III: Testing the control versus quality theses 
Developments in the administration of legal aid in England and Wales have provided 
an interesting opportunity to test the efficacy and implications of specialisation.  In 
the 1990s, the Legal Services Commission (LSC), the governmental, non-
departmental body that administers legal aid, began to move towards encouraging, 
and, from 2000, requiring specialisation, in the provision of legal aid services.   From 
that point, all providers of legal aid had to have Specialist Quality Marks (SQMs) 
under the legal aid scheme.  This meant that they were quality assured by the LSC in 
the general sense (i.e. they had met all their management system standards) and also 
met specialist quality standards in at least one type of law which they were then 
designated as being specialists in.  The most important requirement of the SQM is that 
the provider has at least one person supervising work in that specialism who is 
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themselves specialist in that particular area.7  So, for example, if they had an SQM in 
Housing Law, they would have to have at least one person who specialised in 
Housing Law and supervised the work of any others doing legally aided housing law 
in the organisation.   
The requirement for supervisors to demonstrate relevant and recent experience in each 
work category that they supervise was a step change in the Commission’s approach. It 
moved away from a system which relied on firms to self-regulate the experience of 
their fee earners, and it also meant that, in practical terms, supervisors were limited in 
the number of work categories that they could supervise.8  In effect, firms were 
required to specialise in areas where they had at least one member of staff with 
enough experience to meet the supervisor requirements.  
In this article, the fact that work is supervised by a specialist is used as a proxy for 
that advice having been given by a specialist.  It is possible for the caseworkers (as 
opposed to the supervisors), in practice, to be non-specialists but in broad terms 
caseworkers usually specialise in the one or two particular areas of social welfare law 
within which they practice.  For the purposes of analysis, the group identified below 
as specialists is likely to be more specialist than those identified as non-specialists; 
and the differences are sufficiently strong to provide a valuable means of 
distinguishing the pros- and cons- of specialisation. 
Because the LSC recognised that there were access implications from requiring 
specialists to do all the legal aid work (see below) and the desirability of allowing 
                                                 
7 The supervisor requirements differ depending on which work category is under consideration, but in 
broad terms supervisors are required to either a) maintain a current caseload in each of the work 
categories that they supervise, or b) demonstrate their experience in that work category by reference to 
direct supervision and involvement in cases in the 12 months prior to their being audited.  Law Society 
Panel membership (e.g. in family and clinical negligence) or membership of certain duty schemes (e.g. 
in crime), is sufficient to demonstrate such experience in some work categories. Another route to 
meeting the supervisor requirements involves the supervisor certifying that they carried out 350 hours 
of casework in each of the previous 3 years (roughly assumed to be a third of a normal full-time 
caseload). Other work categories – e.g. housing, employment, debt, immigration and welfare benefits – 
require demonstrable experience in a range of LSC-specified case types and skills (e.g. representation). 
There are other requirements for supervisors to be accessible, to keep themselves and their staff up to 
date, to undergo regular training in each work category, and to subscribe to or have access to certain 
key texts and journals. 
8 The number of categories they can do is not prescribed, but de facto supervisors would struggle to 
meet supervisor requirements and keep current experience in more than two or three work categories. 
14 
providers to develop new specialties, legal aid providers were not required to confine 
themselves purely to the work they specialised in (Legal Services Commission 2002).  
Hence, they were permitted, under what were called ‘tolerances’, to do a limited 
amount of work outside their recognised speciality (the figures vary, but they were 
generally permitted to do about 10% of their work outside of their recognised 
specialties).  This non-specialist work provides us with a comparison with specialist 
work. 
The Studies 
This paper reports on three studies conducted for government agencies on the 
workings of the England and Wales legal aid scheme:9 
• The Anatomy of Access Study (which establishes the level of advice provided 
by ‘generalists’through the use of model clients,  (Moorhead and Sherr 2003); 
• Quality and Access? (Moorhead and Harding 2004) which provides a direct 
comparison of the quality of non-specialist and specialist casework through a 
comparison of case outcomes, peer review by specialist solicitors, and a 
comparison of management, training and supervision of non-specialist and 
specialist work;  
• The Clusters Study (Moorhead et al 2006) which looks in particular at how 
non-specialists and specialists deal with multiple problems (clusters of 
problems) and enables some consideration of the extent to which non-
specialists and specialists deal differently with linked and latent problems to 
the one’s a client presents with. 
To keep this paper within manageable length, only an abbreviated discussion of 
methods is contained below in each relevant section. 
                                                 
9 The studies were conducted with a number of collaborators who’s contributions are gratefully 
ackolwedged: Professors Avrom Sherr and Alan Paterson, Drs Richard Harding and Margaret 
Robinson, Matrix Research and Consultancy and Thornton Drummond and Brett. 
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Anatomy of Access: The quality of ‘quality assured’ non-specialists  
The Anatomy of Access Study provides a direct assessment of the quality of advice 
given by specialist solicitors and advice workers when operating outside their 
specialism.  The LSC had, as part of their Quality Mark, a requirement that, where a 
matter fell outside a provider’s expertise, the client should be referred or signposted 
onto a specialist provider.  Anatomy of Access was principally designed to assess this.  
Specialist providers were approached by a researcher posing covertly as a client (a 
‘model client’) with a problem outside their specialism(s) and the model client could 
then report on how they were dealt with.  294 Specialist Quality Mark holders were 
approached in this way. 
The model clients were trained researchers sent to solicitors and advice agencies to 
pretend they are clients and seek advice. Pioneered in Quality and Cost (Moorhead et 
al 2001) concerns about consent and invasion of privacy mean such techniques must 
be employed with great care.10  Model clients do, however, present major advantages 
over other methods.11  The model client scenarios (their cases, or alternatively, the 
stories that they told) were based on stories taken form real legal aid files and 
designed in such a way as to suggest to a competent non-specialist adviser that the 
client had reasonably pressing needs which required specialist attention in an area that 
the lawyer/adviser did not hold a specialist contract.  Debt, housing and education 
were the three areas of work selected. Each model client visited or telephoned an 
organisation without a specialist contract in the work category that their problem fell 
into. The specific aim of the research was to test whether, and how effectively, non-
                                                 
10 The approach we adopted complies with the Socio-Legal Studies Association’s guidelines on covert 
research. Solicitors’ firms and advice agencies consented to model client visits as part of their contract 
with the Legal Services Commission and publicity for the project was sent to each and every account 
holder. Anonymity was guaranteed: no data from any model client interview was used to identify an 
individual or their organisation to the Legal Services Commission (or anyone outside the research 
team) in any way.   Thus, whilst providers were aware of, and had consented to, model client visits 
occurring at some time during the life of their contract, they were not advised in advance of when visits 
were imminent.  We had no evidence of model client’s being identified during the course of their visit. 
See, SLSA (2002), Socio-Legal Studies Directory 2002, (Butterworths, London) and Anatomy of 
Access, pp. 9-10 
11 Other methods of research lawyer on quality have tended to rely on the reviewing lawyer’s files 
(which contain important but limited information on lawyer quality) and/or observation of lawyers in 
practice settings when they lawyers would have been aware of the lawyer’s presence and able to 
modify their behaviour accordingly. 
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specialists signposted (referred) clients onto more appropriate providers and, where 
they provided advice, to test the quality of that advice.  That testing was done by 
asking model clients to record the advice they had been given immediately after their 
visit and then asking specialist solicitors’ to evaluate the quality of that advice.  
Whilst advice only occurred in a minority of cases, it is the advice which is of major 
interest to us as it is that which indicates the quality of non-specialists.  
Anatomy of Access Results 
Of the visits attempted, 12% resulted in severe access problems (model clients could 
not get through on the phone, or were simply turned away by the suppliers they 
visited). Between 35% and 40% of clients were signposted to an appropriate supplier 
and between 35% to 40% were signposted to a less appropriate provider (i.e. they 
were not signposted to a local specialist when it appeared they could have been). In 
the remaining 18% of cases, these clients were advised by the providers they 
approached and not signposted on.  Whilst this is a minority of the visits arranged, it 
is worth emphasising that those giving the advice were under no obligation to advise 
and had decided for themselves that they were sufficiently competent to provide the 
advice.  Furthermore, the problems identified in the advice sit alongside the more 
general problems of severe access problems and poor signposting to give a general 
indication of how well those operating in the legal aid scheme work when dealing 
with non-specialist problems.  The results are startling. 
Peer reviewers were asked five particular questions about the quality of advice given 
to model clients, and these are reported in Table 1.  The key findings are:  
• only 20% of the advisers/lawyers who provided advice to our model clients 
were very aware or quite aware of all the legal issues raised; 
• 70% were inadequately or completely unaware of the legal issues raised.  
Marginally fewer advisers were very or quite aware of the practical steps that 
could be taken (16%); and, 
• 72% were inadequately aware or completely unaware.   
The figures were similar for comprehensiveness and accuracy of advice given.   
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Table 1:  Peer review evaluations of advice given to model clients 
    
   % 
 
How aware is the adviser of all legal issues raised? 
Very aware   8.0 
Quite aware   12.0 
Adequately aware   10.0 
Inadequately aware   54.0 
Completely unaware   16.0 
 
How aware is the adviser of practical steps that can be taken now or in 
the future? 
Very aware   6.0 
Quite aware   10.0 
Adequately aware   12.0 
Inadequately aware   62.0 
Completely unaware   10.0 
 
How would you assess the comprehensiveness and accuracy of advice 
on this case? 
Very good   4.0 
Good   12.0 
Adequate   14.0 
Inadequate   52.0 
Poor   18.0 
 
How would you assess the plan of action given to the client? 
Very useful   6.0 
Useful   30.0 
Neither useful nor counterproductive   16.0 
Counterproductive   8.0 
Damaging to the interests of the client   40.0 
 
In your view how justified was the adviser's decision to advise rather 
than refer/signpost? 
Justified   10.0 
Probably justified   20.0 
Don't know/unsure   4.0 
Probably not justified   26.0 
Not justified   40.0 
N   50 
 
In this context, we were further concerned to know the extent to which poor advice 
would be likely have a detrimental impact on real clients.  To this end peer reviewers 
were asked to assess the plan of action given to the model client.  16% of model 
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clients received a plan of action which was neither useful nor counterproductive, 8% 
of plans were counterproductive and a notable 40% were, in the view of our expert 
peers, likely to be damaging to the interests of the client.  This is telling evidence of 
the level and seriousness of the poor quality of advice given to our model clients.  
Peer reviewers were also asked to indicate how justified was the adviser's decision to 
advise rather than refer/signpost.  In 66% of cases the peer reviewers felt the decision 
was not, or probably was not, justified.   
As well as scoring the advice given to the model client, more detailed reports from the 
peer reviewers also suggested what was wrong with the advice.  Aspects of the advice 
were either wrong or missing and advisers tended to rely on weak strategies such as 
suggesting the client negotiated with potential adversaries unaided by concrete advice.  
Non-specialists were seen to skate around the area of law in question without giving 
any firm advice.   
Of course it could be argued that the standards applied by peer reviewers (as 
specialists) were higher than should be expected of non-specialist advice.  There is 
some force in this argument, but peer reviewers tended to give advisers the benefit of 
the doubt where they provided partial advice, even if it did not help the client, as long 
as it was not misleading or potentially prejudicial and the client was invited to come 
back for more advice as their problem developed.  If anything, this suggests a 
generous caution about forming negative judgments on the part of the peer reviewers.   
Are specialists any better?  
The Anatomy of Access Study suggests that in absolute terms the quality of advice 
given out by non-specialists, when they had chosen not to refer clients to specialists, 
was extremely poor.  This raises a significant question mark over any general warrant 
of competence being provided by a professional qualification (or indeed the general 
aspects of quality assurance provided by the LSC’s Quality Mark), but it does not 
establish the value of specialisation.  To do that one has to establish that specialists 
perform better than non-specialists .  A second study looked directly at the differences 
in quality between specialists and non-specialists: Quality and Access? (Moorhead 
and Harding 2004). 
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The Quality and Access Study: Methods 
Five main kinds of data were used in the analysis of quality of specialist and non-
specialist work:  
• Billing data a large sample of over 600,000 bills on legal help cases12 
completed in 2001 had outcome and other data which could be used to provide 
indicative insights into quality;  
• Postal survey data from suppliers carrying out larger volumes of non-
specialist cases about how they managed specialist and non-specialist cases.  
156 of the 387 suppliers sent questionnaires responded; a response rate of 
40%.10  Respondents were broadly representative of those suppliers sent 
questionnaires. 
• 12 semi-structured telephone interviews with a sample of practitioners from 
those who indicated on the postal questionnaire a willingness to be 
interviewed; and, 
• Peer review of a stratified random sample of 643 files (342 specialist and 301 
non-specialist files) took place in late 2002.13   Peer reviewers (solicitors with 
significant experience in the work areas under consideration) marked the 
quality of work as recorded on those files from attendance notes, 
                                                 
12 In broad term legal help cases are cases which do not proceed to litigation.  The range from initial 
advice and assistance to more sustained negotiation and, more occasionally and in limited 
circumstances, representation in tribunal type proceedings. 
10 This is a good response rate for postal-questionnaire-based research. Nevertheless, the results must 
be interpreted carefully. The responses were checked for signs of response bias in terms of the type of 
contractees responding and their approach to non-specialist work.  Contractees with contracts in 
community care and/or medical negligence were less likely to respond than contractees in other work 
categories, and so were underrepresented in our sample. Only a small minority of contractees have 
contracts in community care and/or medical negligence, however.  
13 We selected 951 cases at random from the LSC’s list of all matter report forms (MRFs: these were 
billing forms specifically developed to record key information for the research).  in three work 
categories: debt, housing, and welfare benefits. The samples were stratified to ensure that roughly equal 
numbers of specialist and non-specialist cases were included in each work category. 643 files were 
returned by legal aid providers and reviewed by solicitor peer reviewers. Because not all requested files 
were returned, one concern is that there could be a degree of adverse selection, with firms tending to 
send their better files and retain the ones they were worried about. Our response bias testing suggested 
no systematic difference in the rate of return of files. 
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correspondence and the like, utilising the methodology employed in a previous 
study Quality and Cost (Moorhead et al, 2001). 
Was quality any different for specialists? 
One way of assessing quality of work is to look at the outcomes achieved for clients.  
The type of work we were looking at means such comparisons are limited.  As 
(usually) small cases of initial advice and assistance cases, they often would not be 
expected to produce a result for the client.14 
There are other controversies in using outcome to evaluate the quality of advisers: 
results depend partly on the qualities of advisers, partly on the quality of cases and 
partly on the quality of opponents and third parties such as adjudicators and judges 
(Moorhead et al 1994).  In the context of this paper, in particular, it is possible that 
specialists would get better results because they get better cases, although we sought 
to control for this as far as we could in our analysis.  Nevertheless, outcomes do 
provide one interesting viewpoint on the quality of work. 
Two basic comparisons of outcome were conducted.  The first comparison involves 
looking at whether cases completed.  For each of the four work categories considered, 
the cases of non-specialists were significantly less likely to complete than were 
specialists’ cases: clients of non-specialists were significantly more likely to cease 
giving instructions, go elsewhere or be told by their adviser the case should not be 
continued with. In welfare benefits cases, employment and debt these differences 
were of the order of 6–16%; in housing the difference was only 2%.  The differences 
were statistically significant. 
                                                 
14 Advice in and of itself may be a sufficient benefit or the benefit may not be directly testable; e.g. a 
client asking for advice on entitlement to welfare benefits may or may not go on to get those benefits if 
and when they apply but the adviser would not necessarily know.   
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Table 2: Comparing the number of cases that completed by specialists and 
non-specialists 
 Welfare benefits Debt Employment Housing 
 Specialist Non-
specialist 
Specialist Non-
specialist 
Specialist Non-
specialist 
Specialist Non-
specialist 
Did not 
complete 33.1%  49.4%  39.0%  48.9%  55.0%  60.8%  51.7%  53.6%  
Completed 66.9% 50.6% 61.0% 51.1% 45.0% 39.2%  48.3%  46.4%  
N N=56,594 n=6,312 n=25,430 n=11,865 n=4,787 n=3,472 n=53,123 n=13,001 
Significance 
(chi-square) P<=0.001, X2=663.9 p<=0.001, X2=324.1 p<=0.001, X2=28.3 p<=0.001, X2=15.284 
 
An analysis of the actual outcomes on cases was also completed.  The important 
differences are identified and highlighted in Table 3.  
Table 3: Outcomes by specialist (completed cases) – main differences 
 
Outcome 
 
Contract 
 
Tolerance 
  
 Welfare benefits 
  
Client receives lump sum payment 
X2=514.7, p<=0.001 
14.6%  
(n=8,329) 
4.3%  
(n=272) 
Client receives extra or new regular payment 
X2=231.7, p<=0.001 
14.3%  
(n=8,126) 
7.4% 
 (n=464) 
  
Debt 
   
Client makes extra or new regular payment 
X2=740.0, p<=0.001 
18.0%  
(n=4,567) 
7.3%  
(n=865) 
  
Housing 
   
Client receives or retains property or other permanent 
benefit 
X2=345.1, p<=0.001 
10.2%  
(n=5,407) 
4.9%  
(n=642) 
  
Employment 
   
Client receives lump sum payment 
X2=296.3, p<=0.001 
28.5% 
 (n=1,364) 
12.6% 
 (n=439) 
 
About 29% of specialist welfare benefits clients got lump sump or periodic payments, 
whereas only 13% of non-specialist clients did.  Put another way, on these figures, 
welfare benefits clients seeing specialists were more than twice as likely to get a 
positive financial result as clients being dealt with by non-specialists. Differences 
were similar in employment, debt and housing. It is possible that variations in positive 
outcome are explained by the differences in the profiles of specialist and non-
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specialist cases in terms of case types, levels of case, etc. This was tested by 
performing multiple logistic regressions in welfare benefits and employment cases. 
The regressions confirmed that, even when differences in case profile, cost of cases 
and level at which the case completed at are controlled for, the difference in positive 
outcomes in employment and welfare benefits was statistically significant. Non-
specialist clients were about half as likely to get positive financial results in welfare 
benefits cases, and about half as likely to get positive results in employment cases as 
clients being served under specialist contracts.15  
Do differences in the way non-specialist work is managed suggest quality is 
likely to be lower? 
From interviews with practitioners, staffing patterns and management of non-
specialist work were considered to explore how management issues might interrelate 
with quality concerns.   In general, the impression given was that practitioners did not 
adapt their working practices significantly just because work was non-specialist.  To 
take staffing patterns, for example, there was no clear pattern in the level of staff to 
which non-specialist work was delegated.  In particular, counter-intuitively, relatively 
few (about 15% of) respondents always delegated non-specialist work to unqualified 
staff. The picture on supervision was more equivocal.   If non-specialist work was 
low-level work, supervision on ‘easy’ cases may not be a particular concern. 
Conversely, non-specialist work by definition involved providers in cases where they 
were less likely to have experience, and so supervision might have needed to be 
stronger than it was for work which was their mainstay.  As our analysis of quality 
suggests most persuasively below, stronger supervision is preferable where non-
specialist work is seen to be done to worrying standards.   
Only a minority (albeit a substantial minority, 37%) of respondents said they had 
special supervision arrangements for non-specialist work. One in five respondents 
actually reviewed fewer non-specialist files than in their main contract categories. 
Similarly, no relationship was found between the level of fee earner providing advice 
on non-specialist cases and the way in which files were supervised. So providers 
                                                 
15 See Tables A8 and A9, Appendix A in Quality and Access 
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using non-qualifieds to do non-specialist work were not compensating by 
implementing specific supervisions arrangements for this work.  One potential barrier 
to greater supervision was the absence of anyone with significant experience in the 
relevant area of law to provide that supervision hence comments received in 
interviews which suggested a very light touch to supervising non-specialist work. 
Furthermore, the results did not suggest that the majority of advisers received training 
specific to each work category in which they conduct non-specialist work.  When 
asked what training they had received in non-specialist areas, respondents tended to 
emphasise the general training provided to lawyers during the undergraduate and 
vocational training stages.  Given the emphasis of most undergraduate and vocational 
courses in the UK, which would relatively rarely cover debt, housing and welfare 
benefits, it is doubtful that such training covers the sorts of work that was covered in 
this survey. 
Peer review of non-specialist and specialist work 
In addition to an analysis of outcomes and management systems, solicitors with 
experience of the relevant field of law were asked to evaluate the case files of 
specialists and non-specialists.  Table 4 summarises the overall rating given to 
solicitors.16  A score of 1 represents very poor (or non-) performance. A score of 5 
indicates very good performance. A mark of 3 indicates satisfactory performance. 
Hence a score of less than 3 is indicative of quality concerns on a file.  
Table 4: Overall mark - 1-5 (solicitors only) 
Overall score Specialist Non-
specialist 
N 
1 6.2% 6.6% 29 
2 24.1% 35.9% 142 
3 42.0% 35.5% 170 
4 24.1% 19.5% 95 
5 3.7% 2.4% 13 
n 162 287 449 
 
                                                 
16 The study looked at advice given by solicitors firms and non-solicitors.  For this paper the results for 
solicitors firms are concentrated upon. 
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For solicitors’ cases, 30% of specialist files were marked at 2 or lower and 43% of 
non-specialist files were similarly marked. The difference in the distribution of marks 
is significantly different at the normal levels.17  However if the solicitors’ results are 
considered by work category, then the picture is interesting (see Table 5). 46% of debt 
cases and 47% of welfare benefits cases handled by solicitors under non-specialist 
were scored 2 or less compared with 37% of debt and 21% of welfare benefits cases 
handled by solicitors under contract. However, only the difference for welfare 
benefits cases was significantly different.18 Housing cases had similar rates of 
‘failing’ cases for specialist and non-specialist (35% specialist compared with 32% 
non-specialist). 
Table 5: Overall mark - 1-5 (by non-specialist and work category, solicitors 
only) 
Overall Debt Housing Welfare Benefits 
Mark Contract Tolerance Contract Tolerance Contract Tolerance 
1 6.7% 7.1% 8.5% 4.9% 3.3% 7.5% 
2 30.0% 39.3% 26.8% 26.8% 18.0% 39.8% 
3 53.3% 39.3% 33.8% 40.2% 45.9% 26.9% 
4 6.7% 13.4% 25.4% 24.4% 31.1% 22.6% 
5 3.3% 0.9% 5.6% 3.7% 1.6% 3.2% 
N 30 112 71 82 61 93 
 
Analysis of more detailed quality criteria, enables a more comprehensive 
consideration of differences in competence between non-specialists and specialists.  
Non-specialists were significantly worse than specialists on: 
• fact- and information-gathering skills;19  
• comprehensiveness of advice;20  
• advice being given in time/at the right time;21 and  
                                                 
17 Mann-Whitney U test, p = .021 
18 Mann-Whitney U tests: Debt, p=0.59; Housing, p = .909; and welfare benefits, p=0.014 
19 Chi-square 9.763, p=0.045 
20 Chi-square 12.293, p=0.015 
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• the effectiveness with which the client was informed of the merits (or not) of 
the claim.22  
In other areas, the differences were near (but did not meet) conventional levels of 
statistical significance: appropriateness of the advice to the client’s instructions;23 and 
effectiveness in working towards what the client reasonably wanted/needed through 
letter-writing and form-filling.24  It is also worth noting that the NFP files scored 
more highly than the solicitors’ specialist files on every single criterion, getting hi
positive and negative scores on each one. These differences were statistically 
significant for all criteria bar one.
gher 
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Peer reviewers also wrote reports which supplemented their scores and provided 
qualitative information on the quality problems perceived on files.  The content of 
these was analysed and the following problems were identified as being more 
prevalent on non-specialist files: 
• lack of advice on the files, suggesting a situation where lack of expertise 
prevents an adviser formulating any practical solution or opinion on the case 
which will help the client; 
• lack of basic understanding of the problems and solutions to be offered to a 
client; 
• wrong advice; 
• lack of relevant information; and, 
• lack of action. 
 
21 Chi-square 13.218, p=0.010 
22 Chi-square 10.737, p=0.030 
23 Chi-square 9.315, p=0.054 
24 Chi-square 8.453, p=0.076 
25 Using chi-square tests, p<0.05 save for the question, if no other work was carried out, was this 
appropriate? Which was near significant (p=0.06). 
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The following comments indicate the concerns on the more problematic cases: 
“Firm are under an obligation to use their skills to investigate or to tell client 
the appeal is hopeless. They do neither.”  (Welfare benefits non-specialist 
advice) 
 “…The adviser appears to know absolutely nothing about housing law or 
court procedures. If he does then there is no evidence of this on the file 
whatsoever. There is no evidence of the most basic questions being asked as to 
the client’s status as an occupier of the dwelling. Without that then it is 
difficult to see how the adviser could believe that proper and full advice could 
be given… The worrying thing about this file is that the file appears to have 
been reviewed by a ‘supervisor’ who does not see anything wrong with it” 
(Housing non-specialist) 
“This file is a disgrace and borders on negligence – despite the long-winded 
attendance notes/letter[s], the adviser does not appear to know what the rules 
of entitlement are, as many aspects of the fact finding are irrelevant.…” 
(Welfare benefits non-specialist) 
“The file displayed a total lack of understanding or indeed any attempt to 
understand and advise the client.” (Housing non-specialist)  
From quality to closure 
The results of Anatomy of Access and Quality and Access suggest reasonably 
consistently that specialists provide higher levels of quality than non-specialists and 
that in absolute terms the quality of non-specialist advice can be worryingly poor.  
This is consistent with the structural functionalist claims of specialisation, whilst also 
providing telling evidence on the limits of a professional qualification as a general 
warrant of competence.  Where it has been possible to test it, generalists provide 
quality of advice which are worryingly low.  Compulsory specialisation appears to 
improve quality but this leads us onto the second limb of the debate: does closure also 
lead to detriment to the consumer and, if so, how extensive is this?   
One way in which detriment would be expected to occur is that specialists might 
exploit their marginal advantage in terms of quality and/or scarcity and drive up their 
prices.  With the LSC controlling prices of legal aid work, there is limited opportunity 
for this to occur in this context.  A related way in which consumer detriment might 
occur (because the professions cannot put up their prices or because they cannot 
access sufficiently large markets) is the reduction in access that might arise through 
scarcity.  In Quality and Access the analysis of billing data which was used to 
consider outcomes (above) also provided indicative data on access.  In particular, it 
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was possible to show what proportion of the work was carried out both by specialists 
and by non-specialists and how well dispersed specialist coverage was 
geographically. Table 6 considers the first issue.26 
Table 6: How much work in any particular work category is non-specialist work? 
Generalists Specialists N 
Consumer/contract 84% 16% 8,068 
Actions against the police  56% 44% 4,001 
Employment 42% 58% 8,259 
Education 41% 59% 2,711 
Personal injury 28% 72% 8,269 
Debt 32% 68% 37,301 
Community care 34% 66% 1,557 
Housing 20% 80% 66,165 
Welfare benefits 10% 90% 63,285 
Medical negligence 7% 93% 3,603 
Mental health 1% 99% 19,370 
 
For two work categories – consumer, and actions against the police –clients gained 
access to legal help predominantly from non-specialists indicating major access 
problems in this type of work. About one (or more) clients in three were gaining legal 
advice on problems in employment, education, debt and community care under non-
specialist, and one in five housing clients were getting advice under non-specialist. 
This suggests a substantial need for advice, which was not being met by specialists 
under the legal aid scheme. Indeed, this may underestimate the size of the problem. 
Many contractees only did non-specialist work in a limited number of work 
categories. It is not known whether clients who approached these contractees were 
successfully referred on to an appropriate supplier of advice, or whether the clients 
decided to simply ‘lump‘ (put up with) their problem and not seek advice, although 
the evidence is that this is likely to be a considerable problem.27   
While, these figures paint a national picture, there were regional variations which 
suggested that in many parts of the country the picture would be likely to be worse, 
                                                 
26 Public law/civil liberties is excluded because this was the one area where the LSC system failed to 
identify contractees doing specialist work under contracts. 
27 Anatomy of Access shows considerable problems with the quality of referral and Pleasence at al 
(2004: 76) shows how referral fatigue means that the likelihood of a client seeking advice declines with 
each referral.  
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particularly outside large urban connurbations.  At the time of the research, the LSC 
was using the bid zone as its main unit for measuring the geographic dispersal of 
supply of legal aid services. In broad terms, bid zones were geographic areas usually 
coterminous with local authority boundaries.28  Bid zones were therefore used in 
Quality and Access as the unit of analysis in considering the supply of legal help.29 
As Table 7 shows, within bid zones there was more variation in the supply of services 
by work category than the national figures suggest. On these data, even in mainstream 
areas of legal help, a large proportion of bid zones had no specialist contract holder. 
42% of bid zones had no welfare benefits specialist funded by the LSC. The 
percentages of bid zones without a specialist contractee were: for debt, 40%; housing, 
44%; and employment, 63%.  
Table 7: Proportion of bid zones where there is no specialist contractee in 
that work category 
Work category %
Public law 95%
Community care 91%
Actions against the police 90%
Education 89%
Consumer contract 84%
Immigration 68%
Medical negligence 63%
Employment 63%
Mental health 54%
Housing 44%
Welfare benefits 42%
Debt 40%
Personal injury 13%
Matrimonial 0.5%
N 410
 
                                                 
28 London boroughs, unitary authorities or district council boundaries 
29 It should be noted that in terms of planning supply, certain services, especially specialist services 
such as immigration and mental health, may only be expected to be supplied at a regional level rather 
than at bid zone level. Similarly, the level of legal need differs from bid zone to bid zone. As a result, 
supply might be expected to vary from bid zone to bid zone in individual work categories. It might not 
be expected that even mainstream work categories would be supplied in each bid zone under specialist 
contracts. Nevertheless, bid zones provided the most convenient and meaningful unit to analyse supply 
available to the research. 
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Similarly, certain bid zones had higher levels of tolerance work than others. About 
one in ten bid zones (9%) had more than 30% of legal help matters conducted under 
tolerance. About one in five bid zones (21%) had more than a quarter of legal help 
matters handled under tolerance. These bid zones include urban areas such as 
Gateshead and parts of Liverpool and Manchester, but were otherwise predominantly 
rural bid zones.  
It should also be noted that the data record the position in 2001.  The access problem 
is underlined when one looks at the trend in supply of legal aid in the years 
subsequent to the study.  Table 8 shows the significant decrease in the number of 
contracts across the board and within specific subject areas suggesting a further 
significant diminution in geographic coverage.  It is clear that, as specialisation 
requirements from the Legal Services Commission have taken hold, and as (the 
profession argues) legal aid has become less (or even un-)profitable, the number of 
providers willing to specialise in particular areas of legal aid has decreased.  As I have 
argued elsewhere this decline can be attributed partly to economics; partly to the 
general bureaucracy associated with legal aid provision; and partly to the 
requirements of specialisation itself (Moorhead 2004).  In particular, as firms 
struggled to find or maintain supervisors with the necessary level of specialisation 
they abandoned legal aid work either all together or outside of their core business.  
Whilst concerns with the levels and costs of bureaucracy associated with legal aid 
contracts were strong and the low profitability of legal aid work was a constant and 
pressing concern for practitioners, compulsory specialisation was the factor which 
tipped many firms away from legal aid work. 
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Table 8: Civil legal aid contracts30 
Civil contracts by category 1999-
2000
2005-
2006 
Cumultaive 
change 
Family 4243 2887 -32%
Housing  840 587 -30%
Welfare Benefits  673 459 -32%
Debt 618 401 -35%
Immigration  483 367 -24%
Employment  403 216 -46%
Mental Health  334 283 -15%
Clinical Negligence  250 273 9%
Consumer  193 40 -79%
Education  35 55 57%
Community Care  27 76 181%
Public Law  9 46 411%
All (excl Personal Injury31)  8108 5690 -30%
 
The Clusters Study: Specialisation and the problem of cognitive 
narrowness 
Concerns about cognitive narrowness derive from a number of sources.  One is the 
not-for-profit (NFP) advice movement’s championing of ‘holistic’ advice.  This has 
emphasised that advice service delivery should respond to the notion that clients’ 
problems are often multi-faceted; legal and non-legal; and complex and interrelated 
and not simply draw on narrow legal techniques for problem resolution.  This claim is 
founded on the belief that specialist legal training and the economic incentives of 
private practice, militate against lawyers providing the rounded service that clients 
need.  The importance of holism sits well with recognition that client’s legal needs 
tend to cluster: clients with one legal problem are reasonably likely to have multiple 
problems (Pleasence et al, 2004a; 2004b and 2006).  There is also an increasing 
amount of evidence of the interrelationships between legal and non-legal problems, 
especially in health (Moorhead et al, 2004; Sherr et al, 2002).  
                                                 
30 Source: Constitutional Affairs Select Committee (2007) Third Report - Implementation of the Carter 
Review of Legal Aid  HC 223-I (London: Stationery Office), page 15. 
31 Personal Injury cases arising from negligence other than medical negligence were removed from the 
scheme hence ht figures would have been 100% for personal injury work. 
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The Clusters Study examined how clients with multiple problems that crossed 
specialist boundaries (clusters) were dealt with by both specialist and non-specialist 
advisers (Moorhead et al, 2006). It looked in-depth at a mixture of twelve providers.32 
The research utilised a multi-method approach including: structured observation of 
178 interviews between advisers and clients; structured interviews with advisers on 
487 additional cases; and 35 semi-structured interviews with advisers about clients 
with multiple problems and surrounding service-delivery issues. We interviewed 58 
clients about their experiences shortly after the interview, a further 36 of these clients 
were re-interviewed about their cases three or four months after the interview to get a 
stronger sense of how their cases had developed. Two workshops were held with 
advisers and stakeholders to discuss the research and assist in the analysis of findings.  
Results: how multiple problems are managed 
The analysis in this study was able to focus on the specialities of the particular 
advisers who were interviewed, and also the specialties contained within the 
organisation. This enabled an exploration of the extent to which the adviser’s 
expertise and/or the expertise available within their organisation, shaped the trajectory 
of client service delivery. 
Because we had data on the specialties of the advisers we observed and of the 
organisation, more broadly we were able to look at whether a client approached an 
organisation that had a specialist in that type and also whether the:  
• problems presenting to specialists that were within their specialism;  
• problems presenting to specialists that were outside their specialism; and,  
• problems presenting to generalists (who by definition did not have a 
specialism).  
The first finding of note is that both generalists and specialists failed to probe beyond 
presenting problems and identify non-presenting problems, even when these might be 
                                                 
32 A mixture of solicitors, Citizens Advice Bureaux (CABx), law centres/specialist advice agencies and 
local authority providers in three main areas of social welfare law where clusters were particularly 
likely to occur: housing, benefits and debt 
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related to the presenting problem (e.g. a debt problem that was related to a welfare 
benefits problem) (Moorhead et al 2006: 51 et seq).  However it was not possible to 
discern concrete differences between specialists and generalists in this regard: both 
missed latent problems.   
Greater differences occurred in the way they managed problems that were identified 
that were outside the specialists’ expertise.  Both generalist advisers and specialists 
who are faced with problems outside their expertise were, as one would expect, less 
able or willing to deal fully with such problems than specialists faced. Some simply 
acknowledged the problems rather than providing any advice, a strategy which was 
more marked for specialists than generalists.  Generalists were also more likely to 
advise clients to deal with the problem themselves whereas specialists were more 
likely to tell the client there was no action they could take (even though they did not 
have specialist knowledge of the problem type; a strategy which Anatomy of Access 
suggests was often implicated in poor quality).  Similarly, generalists were much 
more likely than specialists faced with problems outside their expertise to signpost or 
signpost or refer clients to another source of advice (Moorhead et al 2006: 43): 
generalists did this for 28% of problems; specialists did this for 13% of problems they 
were not specialist in.    
The difference in signposting/referral activity is intriguing. Why were generalists 
signposting/referring more often than specialists? One explanation is that for 
generalists, signposting was a more central part of their job. They were expected to 
identify problems, deal with those that were not complex, and signpost on those that 
required more detailed assistance. Specialists were in a different position: they saw 
their job as dealing with the problems they were expert in.  When faced with 
something outside their expertise they might give some advice (a strategy which 
Anatomy of Access would suggest we ought to be worried about) or tell the client 
nothing could be done rather than refer the client on to someone who better 
understood the particular problem despite the contractual requirement under legal aid 
to signpost or refer clients on.33  
                                                 
33 The Specialist Quality Mark Standard states that, “Where a member of the Community Legal 
Service (CLS) or the Criminal Defence Service (CDS) cannot provide the particular service needed by 
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Furthermore, generalists seemed most likely to advise that the client should deal with 
the problem themselves. Anatomy of Access showed the dangers of this (Moorhead 
and Sherr, 2003: 57–58) and the Clusters Study showed that the capacities of clients 
to deal with problems themselves was also significantly questioned by clients who 
often felt totally out of their depth (Moorhead et al 2006: 78-81). The specialists 
dealing with a problem outside their specialism more often indicated a willingness to 
help which did not commit to representation or negotiation on behalf of the client and 
also more often indicated no action was available. Again, there is an evidenced risk 
that advisers dealing with problems outside of their own specialism, misdiagnose 
them as ones for which there is no solution when in fact a solution does exist 
(Moorhead and Sherr, 2003: 57). 
Organisational expertise 
The Clusters Study also considered whether the expertise of the organisation had an 
impact on the way the client’s problem manifested and was dealt with. For example, 
client choices and adviser strategies during interviews might both be influenced by the 
organisation within which an interview was taking place. A client might be more 
likely to raise problems outside an adviser’s expertise where they know that the 
organisation deals with such problems. Furthermore, an adviser might be more likely 
to, or more confident in, dealing with problems that they know their colleagues deal 
with either because they are more sensitised to those (e.g. through intra-organisational 
training or the opportunity to discuss a wider range of problems with colleagues) or 
because they know they can refer the client on relatively easily. Alternatively, they 
may have a stronger incentive to identify and deal with problems where it helps their 
organisation fund more cases under contracts. The opposite is also possible. Suppliers 
who are operating beyond their capacity may have an incentive to pass cases on to 
other suppliers, even where they deal with those problems in-house.  The advice 
strategy for generalists did not differ significantly depending on their institutional 
                                                                                                                                            
the client, they must inform the client and direct them to an alternative service provider, where 
available.” LSC (2005), p. 32. 
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context nor did that for specialists. 34   The results suggest that adviser characteristics 
and roles are more important determinants of advice strategy than the organisation’s 
capacities.  The one area where this was not the case was signposting/referral 
behaviour: generalist advisers’ levels of signposting did not differ significantly 
depending on the organisational context but specialists did.35  Specialists were more 
likely to signpost or refer clients on to other advisers where their own organisation 
had the extra expertise.  This is suggestive of a reluctance by specialists to 
refer/signpost clients outside of their own organisations.  In this sense specialisation 
may interact with organisational context to make consumer detriment more likely. 
IV. Conclusions and implications 
The results show that, for legal aid practitioners, the levels of competence of non-
specialists are worryingly low.  In absolute terms, the levels of incompetence shown 
in the Anatomy of Access and Quality and Access studies genuinely question the 
extent to which a professional qualification acts as a general warrant of competence.  
Specialists on the other hand show higher, but not always satisfactory, levels of 
competence.  As Quality and Access indicates, however, the imposition of 
compulsory specialisation in legal aid has also had a significant detrimental impact on 
access to justice.  Suppliers of specialist services are necessarily fewer and less 
geographically dispersed than more generalist providers.  The Clusters study suggests 
that there is some, albeit modest, evidence that cognitive narrowness is a problem 
rightly associated with specialisation. 
From this it can be seen that specialisation shows both functionalism and control to be 
genuinely in play.  Importantly for theories which like to portray professions as 
fundamentally controlling or functional, the data recorded here suggests that 
functionalism and control are mutually constitutive of each other.  Specialisation does 
indeed improve quality, but this improvement is engendered at a cost to consumers 
(here in terms of reduced access to justice, rather than increased costs but in freer 
markets than legal aid one might predict that prices would rise).  It is inevitable, then, 
                                                 
34 Moorhead et al 2006:47 
35 Ibid. 49 
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that both functionalism and control predict the profession’s behaviour simultaneously.  
As a result, those regulating specialisation (here the LSC, but the point applies to any 
professional regulator) are engaged in a process of a managed paradox.   
How are the trade-offs engendered by specialisation to be managed?  The diminution 
in access cannot easily be compared with the increase in quality: the two issues are 
incommensurate.  Nor do the two dominant theories of professions assist: market 
control theories predict specialisation will be structured to benefit the profession; 
structural functionalists, that it will be benefit the public.  Specialisation benefits 
specialists and their clients and harms the generalists and their clients, or (more 
accurately) highlights the harm caused to the clients who cannot access specialist 
advice (who either get poorer quality advice or no access at all). 
This suggests that closer attention should be paid to how the balance is struck, who 
strikes it and what mechanisms can be used to diminish the antithesis rather than 
trying to prove that specialisation (or professionalism) is inherently functional or 
inherently controlling.  A contrast between the LSC and the Solicitors’ Regulation 
Authority, the regulatory arm of the solicitor’s professional body – the Law Society, 
is illuminating.  The LSC, for example, has clearly struck the balance in favour of 
compulsory specialisation.  They have done so in consultation with the profession 
(which had a view somewhat hostile to the LSCs position) and with considerable 
power as a monopsonic purchaser.  Furthermore, they have sought to diminish the 
importance of the trade-off between access and quality by making telephone advice a 
vehicle for diminishing the access problems and moved to solve some of the cognitive 
narrowness problems by seeking to bring specialists together in Community Legal 
Advice Centres or Networks (CLACs and CLANs) so that as many specialisations 
operate under one roof, or within one network, as possible.  Whether these reforms 
will genuinely resolve the dilemmas posed by specialisation or are mere window 
dressing remains to be seen.   
The solicitor profession’s approach stands in contrast.  Specialisation is not 
specifically a regulatory tool which licenses practitioners of certified competence to 
practice in a particular area but as a marketing tools to promote specialist work.  In 
this way, the Law Society (and latterly the Solicitors Regulation Authority) have 
tended towards accepting the idea of omni-competence: that general professional 
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qualification is sufficient to guarantee competence across the range of legal services 
whilst seeking to accommodate the claims of specialist (and their desire to accredit 
and advertise themselves as such) without granting them exclusive control of 
particular types of work.  This response is founded on two concerns.  The first is to 
protect the validity of the general professional qualification as a general warrant of 
competence.  This is part of the profession’s fundamental claim to legitimacy.  The 
second is a wariness of delivering control over particular markets to specialists (see, 
for example SRA 2007:4). 
The profession, in accrediting specialists, is thus forced into accepting the benefits of 
specialisation whilst also seeking to protect the interests of non-specialists by not 
according specialists’ market control.  This it usually does by ensuring specialisation 
is voluntary and also open to all those who demonstrate basic levels of experience, 
rather than higher, levels of competence (SRA 2007: 4).  There are international 
parallels.  Kahn and Kahn describe how in the 1970s, the ABA resisted the 
development of a specialist criminal accreditation scheme which might test 
competence or look to minimum levels of regular experience in a criminal practice in 
favour of a scheme which aimed at those wishing to claim the ability to say they were 
qualified in criminal law (Kahn and Kahn 1977: 268 et seq).  Specialists are thus not 
generally granted a monopoly beyond that afforded to the profession generally. The 
ABA’s concerns were typical and are echoed in more current debates about 
specialisation.  They wished to prevent the creation of, “a small coterie of high-priced 
criminal lawyers by promulgating nearly unattainable standards” (ibid 269); to limit 
costs to clients; to protect the solo general practitioner; and to protect access to justice 
in rural areas (ibid 289).  And yet there is something very strange in a profession, 
which by virtue of its high entry standards and protracted period of training, claims a 
general warrant of competence (and often monopoly) over legal work, and yet 
recognises specialist accreditation schemes which are neither granted any form of 
monopoly nor have higher standards demanded of them than mere competence.  
The latter concern emphasises the paradox of specialisation because it requires 
professions to accept the ‘market control’ thesis – the idea that specialisation acts to 
the detriment of consumers because it inhibits competition – whilst claiming that 
same protection from competition for the profession as a whole.  The position 
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becomes particularly paradoxical if one is to assume that that the results outlined 
above in relation to legal aid practitioners holds generally.  If generalist’s work shows 
significant levels of incompetence in absolute terms and relative to specialists, the 
profession is denying particular market protection to those that are competent whilst it 
protects the incompetent when faced with competitive threats from outside the 
profession.  At first blush, the position is both incoherent and contrary to the public 
interest. 
It might however be possible to justify their approach on two bases.  One would be 
that the consumer detriment that would be suffered by increasing specialisation in 
terms of reduced access and increased costs may be more serious than the 
improvements in quality that would result from restricting all work to specialists.  
Accreditation of specialists on a voluntary, rather than compulsory basis, would allow 
the market to decide whether specialists should be preferred to generalists.  There are 
a number of imponderables in this argument: particularly the unknown extent to 
which consumers recognise and act on the benefits of specialisation.  There is of 
course impediment to consumers doing this: in particular a significant lack of 
information by which they can gauge the relative quality of providers.  In any event, 
the ‘let the market decide’ strategy is further undermined by the second limb of 
professional policy on this issue: the idea that standards for specialist accreditation 
schemes should be modest.  This is harder to justify under a voluntary scheme as it 
dilutes the utility of the concept of specialisation.  Consumers are provided with an 
opportunity to choose between (presumably cheaper and/or local) generalists  and 
(more expensive and/or geographically distant) specialists who in fact have reached a 
standard not dissimilar to that which all generalists should be able to achieve.  The 
result is that a weak and voluntary standard diminishes the extent to which consumers 
can make a genuine choice between generalists and ‘real’ specialists.   
Interestingly, we can see also here how the specialisation as fragmentation problem 
plays out.  The fragmentation thesis is that specialisation weakens the profession’s 
ability to speak as one on regulatory issues (Seron op.cit.: 593) and yet the policy on 
specialisation is very difficult to explain as anything other than an attempt by the 
profession to speak and act as one: protecting the interests of specialists and 
generalists in a way which maintains a degree of unity over and above the public 
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interest.  For me this suggests a weakness in the idea that we should see the 
fragmentation thesis as threatening the profession: a profession which more explicitly 
defined and managed its differences might more strongly protect the public interest 
and better match the way law is, or ought to be, practised on the ground.  After all, the 
medical profession has a much stronger and better developed sense of specialisation 
which has not damaged its professional standing.  Fragmentation is a sociological 
distraction when a much more fundamental issue about professions is in play: their 
core claim to competence. 
Would an approach which better formalised specialisation fatally undermine the 
profession’s legitimacy?  That must be a risk, but it would be a risk borne out of the 
profession’s inability to render its general warrant of competence meaningful.  The 
general qualification might become a staging post on the way to specialist practice 
(which would suggest training costs would increase not decrease as a result of 
specialisation) or it might whither with lawyers qualifying more directly as specialists 
(where training costs, and so prices for clients, might be expected to be lower).  There 
are other risks in such developments of course: the cognitive narrowing caused by 
specialisation is a real risk, as has been shown above, but the evidence so far suggests 
it is a modest risk and generalists only do ‘better’ in holistic terms if they have 
specialists to refer to.  Specialist accreditation schemes do risk building in 
inflexibilities as markets and new areas of law develop.  This suggests that voluntary 
schemes are likely to be more appropriate than compulsory schemes, but that the 
professions (or other regulators) have to do more to support and define genuine 
specialisation as a core proxy for quality.  Their claim exclusive competence, and so 
their legitimacy, depends upon it. 
-end- 
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